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DANGERS OF MONETARY COMMENSURABILITY:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL GAME MODEL OF CONTAGION
PETER H. HUANGt
I traded fame for love
Without a second thought
It all became a silly game
Some things cannot be bought
INTRODUCTION
Matthew Spitzer recently wrote: "One who is to write a comment
on a well-done piece has two choices. The commentator can nit pick
over details or use the well-done article as a starting place for further
work. I choose to do the latter."2 His comment applies to the task of
commenting on Matthew Adler's3 and Richard Craswell's 4 contribu-
tions to this Symposium. Adler found that incommensurability does
not prevent using (the monetized version of) cost-benefit analysis
(CBA), except possibly for a psychological claim related to commodi-
fication.5 Craswell concluded that incommensurability as presently
formulated does not prevent applying welfare economics to evaluate
government decisions. Craswell noted that his definition of incom-
mensurability differs from the related concern of commodification,
which he views as being about the cognitive and social psychological
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spillover effects of government decisions. Craswell also pointed out
that incommensurability theory does not provide guidance about how
to justify public choices among incommensurable options because
most of the philosophical literature on values and practical reason
deals only with justifying an individual's choices among incommensu-
rable options.8
Thus, both articles provide a natural departure point for the fur-
ther work of evaluating the social psychological concerns raised by
the issues of commodification and commensurability with money.
While both articles view the possible psychologically undesirable con-
sequences of government decisionmaking based on monetary com-
mensurability as being empirical, the models below demonstrate that
even in a sympathetic theoretical analytical framework, such psycho-
logical concerns are only a possibility and not a necessity. In other
words, universal monetary commensurability or commodification is
but one of several equilibrium outcomes even when there is a possible
"domino effect." The cognitive psychological reasons to be skeptical
of commodification are not considered below in order to provide the
most favorable setting to evaluate commodification and because they
already have been aptly discussed.9
The rest of this introductory section presents very brief summa-
ries of the main contributions of both articles. Part I, in abiding by
Roberta Romano's view that "the most useful role of a commentator
[is] that of an irritating troublemaker,"'0 presents the questions and
comments raised by other Symposium participants and the responses
by Adler and Craswell. Part II discusses implications for CBA and
welfare economics of formulations of incommensurability other than
those considered by Adler, Craswell, and the other Parts of this
Comment. Part III considers whether the discourse of commensur-
ability, and more generally of economics, can transform its speakers
and listeners. Parts IV and V explain how the recent advent of psy-
chological game theory allows the formulation of models of monetary
commensurability and commodification that capture analytically the
concern about cultural effects and expressive dimensions of legal
7 See id. at 1422-23.
a See id. at 1463-64.
9 See Scott Altman, (Com)modifyingExperenc4 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 301-06, 308-09,
311-12, 325-29, 330, 332-33, 338 (1991) (noting circumstances in which commodifi-
cation does not account for human reactions).
'0 Roberta Romano, A Comment on Information Overload, Cognitive illusions, and Their
Implicationsfor Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 313 (1986).
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rules and institutions. These psychological game-theoretic models
draw on behavioral economics and social psychology to provide a
language for addressing criticisms of CBA and welfare economics
based on concerns about the possible contagion across people of
monetary commensurability of a particular value and the closely re-
lated concern of the possible domino effect of commodification
across values. Both monetary commensurability and commodifica-
tion involve only a single aspect of markets, which also encompass
other activities, such as brokerage, worker training, and advertising."
Adler introduced a useful trichotomy of possible sources of in-
commensurability: (1) conventional ordering failures; (2) esoteric- • 12
ordering failures; and (3) second-order considerations. After con-
sidering the implications of each of these for CBA, Adler argued that
none of them precludes the otherwise justified use of CBA, except for
possibly the second-order consideration of "constitutive incommen-
surability," which rests upon an unproven empirical psychological
13claim. This hypothesized psychological fact is that humans are un-
able to be appropriately affected and motivated by parenthood,
friendship, and environmental awe unless they believe in monetary
incommensurability regarding children, friends, and mountains, even
when there appears to be monetary commensurability.
1 4
Craswell provided the very useful public service of clarifying and
unpacking various criticisms based on incommensurability of values
from related but distinct non-incommensurability-based objections to
welfare economics. Craswell introduced the useful dichotomy be-
tween government decisions that affect only a single individual and
those that affect at least two individuals with at least one person being
better off according to her utility function and one person being
worse off according to his utility function.
" See MARGARETJANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 135-36 (1996) (discussing
regulation of these activities relating to commodified goods).
12 SeeAdler, supra note 3, at 1383-89.
IS See id. at 1389-401 (discussing conventional ordering failures); id. at 1401-08
(discussing esoteric ordering failures); id. at 1409-17 (discussing second-order consid-
erations).
14 Cf Jason ScottJohnston, Million-Dollar Mountains: Prices, Sanctions, and the Legal
Regulation of Collective Social and Environmental Goods, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1327, 1328
(1998) (arguing that the "money-price allocation of certain kinds of relationships is
likely to result in the eventual destruction of the value inherent in those relation-
ships").
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I. SUMMARY OF PANEL DISCUSSION
I now turn to a summary of the colloquy that followed Adler's and
Craswell's presentations at the Symposium. Eric Posner asked wheth-
er undesirable psychological consequences of the government using
CBA means that we cannot be agnostic over using CBA. Craswell
responded that if using CBA actually produces bad consequences of
any kind, including psychological ones, that would be a reason not to
use CBA or welfare economics, even if such theories are otherwise
normatively justifiable.' 5 Adler's response was that, although it may
be constitutive of parenthood that no finite monetary amount makes
up for the loss of a child, such a claim amounts to a conventional
ordering failure that CBA would track accurately.
Richard Warner asked two clarifying questions about constitutive
incommensurability, which he defined by two features: incomparabil-
ity and what he called rigidity of rankings. First, Warner asked
whether CBA is inconsistent with incommensurability because CBA
ignores any such rigidities in rankings. Adler again responded that
any such rigidities would constitute a conventional ordering failure
that CBA would track accurately. Second, Warner asked whether
purely ordinal rankings that abstract from such rigidities provide suf-
ficient information to resolve interpersonal conflicts. Craswell re-
plied that such a difficulty is the standard incommensurability
difficulty, which welfare economists have claimed for many years,
namely, the impossibility of making interpersonal comparison of utili-
ties. Craswell added that, although he was not able to make a very
strong defense for cardinal ranking procedures like the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion, incomparability theorists have not yet proposed any viable
alternative social decision procedures.
Gillian Hadfield asked whether economists' assumptions that in-
dividual utilities are well-behaved in the sense of being not only con-
tinuous, but also twice differentiable functions over wealth, are not
just simplifying assumptions, but instead are fundamental assump-
tions without which both the theory and the application of welfare
economics become problematic. Adler agreed that individual utility
functions over money and other things might be discontinuous and
," Cf. Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215,
1228 (1998) (arguing that claims of commensurability or incommensurability can be
ascriptive as well as descriptive, and that, to the degree that such claims are ascriptive,
they should be chosen self-consciously to serve instrumentally certain normative or
prescriptive ends).
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thus cause problems for CBA. Craswell agreed that the mathematical
convenience of such technical assumptions certainly drives their
adoption and very often leads economists to believe that those as-
sumptions are descriptively accurate. At the same time, Craswell
noted that the critics of welfare economics often conflate criticisms of
such methodologically convenient assumptions with criticisms of the
underlying formal theory.
Such a distinction is analogous to one made by Polinsky in his
famous introductory book on law and economics, namely, that be-
tween criticisms of economic analysts versus criticisms of economic
analysis. Appropriately enough, Polinsky made this distinction in
discussing the difficulties in placing monetary values on costs and
benefits. He noted that critics' discussions of the bias of both ignor-
ing hard to quantify costs and benefits, and of substituting personal
estimates and subjective beliefs for such values, are criticisms of eco-
nomic analysts, not criticisms of economic analysis, properly and care-
fully performed.' 6 Of course, if CBA can be conducted properly only
in theory, but not in practice-in the sense that people suffer from
inevitable and uncorrectable cognitive biases when engaged in doing
or interpreting CBA-this presents a problem for CBA. Such a claim
is ultimately empirical and begs the question of why those biases per-
sist and cannot be mitigated by learning. This claim is related to the
criticism of risk regulation that, once the numbers are out there (in
that case, dollar values for human lives), those numbers take on lives
of their own and tend to be misapplied because of their apparent
precision.
Lewis Kornhauser 's pointed out that for the purpose of welfare
economics, economists are not solely interested in people's choices
for their own sake, but also want to attribute some significance to
those choices, in the sense of thinking those choices are somehow
good choices. An individual's choices might be valued because they
are good indicators of that individual's well-being or simply because
they are the choices that individual made. An individual's observed
choices are of interest to economists because they provide data that
16 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 138 (2d
ed. 1989).
17 See Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. (forth-
coming 1998) (manuscript at pt. III.B, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review).
'a Komhauser also raised a conceptual and technical point about the formal
model in Parts IV and V of this Comment.
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may be helpful in predicting that individual's choices in some other
situation. Craswell agreed, but pointed out that such an inference
problem occurs even when the observed choice does not involve in-
comparables. Craswell added that observations of a person's choice
in situation x do not necessarily provide any information about how
that person would choose in another situation y, except for the idea
of empirical regularity across most (or like) situations. Craswell con-
cluded by pointing out that the separate autonomy-based rationale
for deferring to an individual's choice is supported by such incompa-
rability theorists' accounts of choice as coherence or will.
Ruth Chang questioned whether esoteric ordering failures due to
incomparability do indeed augment the welfarist case against CBA.
Adler replied that incomparability of two choices, by itself, does not
create a reason not to use scaling procedures. Chang also raised the
issue of CBA constraining the government's choice over time under
uncertainty. Kornhauser re-posed the question in terms of an eviden-
tiary problem as to what exactly can be inferred from the making of a
particular choice between incomparables in one context as to what
choice would or should be made between incomparables in another
context. Hadfield crystallized this point by citing the questionable, if
not inappropriate, use of a figure for the value of human life in the
infamous Ford Pinto case.t9 Kornhauser pointed out that assuming
transitivity provides a lot of informational leverage for making infer-
ences from observed choices. Craswell pointed out that what really
provides predictive power is not just transitivity but also context inde-
pendence of much choicemaking.
Finally, Alan Strudler thought that not all incommensurabilists
are primarily worried about the psychologically corrosive effects of
commensurability, but instead simply argue that thinking about
things in terms of commensurability gives the wrong answer. Strudler
felt that the psychological analysis was being given far too much play
in the session. Strudler also questioned Craswell's request that in-
commensurabilists come up with an alternative theory or decision
procedure to welfare economics or CBA. Strudler suggested that
many of the policy questions that welfare economics and CBA address
might not be addressed appropriately by theory or decision proce-
dures because policy (like mathematical axiom systems) might have
'9 See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 384-85 (Ct. App. 1981)
(discussing whether Ford was liable for punitive damages because it failed to fix a
known, potentially lethal problem with gas tank placement because the cost of correc-
tion was higher than the anticipated cost of compensating injured parties).
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no one true or correct universal decision procedure. Craswell re-
sponded by pointing out that both of the session's papers bracketed
psychological considerations, devoting only a small portion of time
and space to such issues. Craswell added that the psychological in-
quiry does not so much involve discovering a universal truth about
(in)commensurability, but, as pointed out by Schauer, determining
which attitude towards (in) commensurability induces better deci-
sions. Adler concluded by reiterating that we are not interested in
theoretical reasoning for its own sake, but rather that we care about
models and theories because of their implications for improving, if
not perfecting, legal institutions and decision procedures.
II. ALTERNATIVE NOTIONS OF INCOMMENSURABILIY
Incommensurability claims have been in vogue of late in the legal
academy. But, as with many instances of legal scholarship drawing on
other academic disciplines, something often gets lost in the transla-
tion or (mis)application of ideas from other fields of inquiry. In this
case, the idea of incommensurability comes from the philosophical
literature, in particular, discussions of practical reasoning. There is
much intuitive appeal to incommensurability claims, as vividly illus-
trated by the reader's or audience's reactions to such choice situa-
tions as those forcibly contemplated in Sophie's Choice' or made in
Indecent ProposaL2 Yet, perhaps because of the strong emotional reso-
nance or moral outrage these "desperate exchanges"23 or "double
binds"24 evoke in us, they may be mere fanciful, atypical hypotheticals
and not real-life decisions faced every day by individuals, legal deci-
sionmakers, or policy analysts who are engaged in so-called "cool"
rational deliberation.
Part of the confusion this Symposium has illuminated stems from
the simple fact that different people mean so many different ideas by
the one word incommensurability, and so people often end up talk-
ing past or at, instead of to, each other. Thankfully, most of the par-
ticipants in this Symposium explicitly define exactly what they mean
by the term incommensurability. Unfortunately, these definitions
run the gamut from Ruth Chang's distinction between incommen-
See Schauer, supra note 15, at 1225-33.
21 WILLIAM STYRON, SOPHIE'S CHOICE 483-84 (1979).
2 INDECENT PROPOSAL (Paramount 1993).
23 RADIN, supra note 11, at 48-49.
24 Id. at 124.
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surability, meaning the lack of precise cardinal comparability, and
incomparability (even in the sense of an ordinal ranking),2
5 to Eric
Posner's incommensurability as a focal equilibrium point in a signal-
26
ing or cheap-talk game, to Leo Katz's view that incommensurability
is often due to imperfect observability or insufficiently fine-grained
detailed knowledge about objects.
' A nice synopsis of various mean-
ings of incommensurability exists in Radin's discussion about reduc-
tionism and commensurability.
2 8
Craswell defined incommensurability as the lack of a scale or
metric that both satisfies completeness (in the sense that, for any two
conceivable options, one has to rank higher on that scale or they have
the same ranking along that metric) and justifies choosing the higher
ranked option.2 Craswell's definition suggests a few related plausible
definitions of incommensurability. These include a notion of incom-
plete ordinal preference rankings, that is only partial orderings and
the resulting "pockets" of incomparability within the space of con-
ceivable alternatives where there is a lack of trichotomy. But, CBA in
its monetized version assumes universal commensurability with
money. The ranking over alternative social programs generated by
CBA coincides with that under the well-known Kaldor-Hicks (hypo-
thetical compensation) criterion, which compares aggregate benefits
and aggregate costs without regard as to how those aggregate benefits
or aggregate costs are distributed 
over society.
30
A related, but distinct, incommensurability is that due to the lit-
eral incompleteness of actual markets. Not all of the possible com-
modities that in principle could exist are traded on markets, let alone
competitive ones, especially if goods are not only characterized by
physical attributes, but also indexed by date, location, and states of
the world.3 ' In fact, one of the most fertile areas of recent research in
2 See Ruth Chang, Comparison and the Justification of Choice, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1569
(1998).
6 See Eric A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of Pincipled Behavior A Critique of the Incom-
mensurability Thesis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1185 (1998).
2 See Leo Katz, Incommensurable Choices and the Problem of Moral Ignorance, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 1465 (1998).
2 See RADIN, supra note 11, at 8-12.
29 See Craswell, supra note 4, at 1421-22.
so See EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 280
(1978).
3' See KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITs OF ORGANIZATION 34-35 (1974).
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the general equilibrium theory of perfectly competitive markets deals
with incomplete security markets.
2
Another sense of incommensurability denies that individuals are
always able to make trade-offs between competing values or alterna-
tives. This concept of incommensurability is compatible with indi-
viduals having a complete ordering, just one which can not be
represented by a continuous scalar-valued function. This lexico-
graphic interpretation of incommensurability captures a hierarchical
idea of needs or values and is consistent with a humanistic type of
welfare economics."
Yet another notion of incommensurability revolves around certain
intransitivities of the sort Joseph Raz described as the test or mark of
incommensurability.3 Perhaps this connection is not surprising be-
cause there is a technical economic literature demonstrating that if
consumers' preference relations are transitive and continuous, they
are necessarily complete.s
Finally, there is the view that incommensurability reflects value
pluralism in the sense of the impossibility of aggregating multiple
choice criteria into a single social choice criterion under certain rea-
sonable conditions.3 But, as Komhauser pointed out, it is unclear
what reasonable conditions may be imposed on the aggregation pro-
cedure in this context.
37
III. CAN COMMENSURABILITYDISCOURSE BE HARMFUL?
The idea that any particular language constrains both a commu-
nicator and her audience should not be surprising, especially to mul-
tilingual individuals. Thus, the notion that people who have been
exposed to the discourse of monetary commensurability might think
and behave differently from those who have not is certainly plausible
32 See, e.g., MICHAEL MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS
(1996); Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Competitive Equilibrium of Incomplete Marketsfor
Securities with Smooth Payoffs, 23J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 219 (1994).
Se MARKA. LuTz & KENNETH Lux, HUMANISTIC ECONOMICS 9-12, 80-31, 188-50
(1988).
SeeJOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 325-26, 328 (1986).
See David Schmeidler, A Condition for the Completeness of Partial Preference Relations,
39 EcONOMETRIcA 403, 404 (1971).
See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL
PLURALISM 172-82 (1987); Matthew L. Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Applica-
tion of Public Choice Theory to Bakke, the F.C.C., and the Courts, 88 YALE LJ. 717 (1979).
37 SeeLewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1599 (1998).
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and a real possibility. Furthermore, there is evidence that students of
economics act differently in experimental situations than students not
exposed to economics. For example, a well-known study revealed that
first-year economics graduate students are more apt to free-ride in
experiments requiring private contributions to public goods.3 First-
year economics graduate students also had difficulty with the mean-
ing of "fairness" and basing their decisions on considerations of
"fairness." This study has been criticized, however, for not controlling
for age and gender differences between the "noneconomic" control
groups (undergraduates and high school students with equal num-
bers of males and females) and the economics graduate students• 39
(predominantly older males).
Another study, not subject to this particular criticism, investigated
the effect of enrolling in an introductory microeconomics course at
Cornell University on the answers to questions about a pair of hypo-
thetical ethical dilemmas.40 The control group was an introductory
astronomy class. There were two subject groups, one taught by an
economist who specialized in the field of industrial organization and
taught some rudimentary game theory, and one taught by a develop-
ment economist who did not include any instruction on game theory.
Students completed a survey during the first and last weeks of class.
This survey consisted of four questions: two questions about losing or
finding an envelope containing $100 and an individual's name and
phone number, and two questions about receiving delivery of ten
personal computers but only being billed for nine. Students indi-
cated the probability that they would be honest, as well as their per-
ceived probability that others would 
be honest.
4'
Because the above study design has a potential drawback of stu-
dents understating the "undesirable" effects of their education to
themselves and others, another complementary study design involved
actual choices in experimental games with monetary payoffs.
42 Stu-
dents played a game involving cooperativeness, namely, the well-
known prisoner's dilemma. The prisoner's dilemma is a two-person,
one-shot game in which each player chooses to cooperate or defect.
' See Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else?: Ex-
periments on the Provision of Public Goods, IV, 15J. PUB. ECON. 295 (1981).
3' See Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 1993, at 159, 160.61.
40 See id. at 168-70.
4, See id. at 168.
42 See id. at 163-64.
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The key feature of the prisoner's dilemma is that defecting is a domi-
nant strategy for each player in that it yields higher payoffs to either
player than does cooperating regardless of how the other player be-
haves. Both players defecting, however, results in the lowest total
monetary payoff of all of the four possible outcomes. Thus, the pris-
oner's dilemma provides a setting to investigate the conflict between
individual and social or group rationality (assuming the game is one-
shot and there is common knowledge of players' rationality and pref-
erences).
Frank et al. found that the probability of an economics major de-
fecting is about 0.17 higher than that of a non-economics major de-
fecting when the subjects were not allowed to make promises about
what they would do.4 When such promises, which were unenforce-
able due to their anonymity, were allowed, there were virtually no
differences in defection rates. An exit questionnaire revealed that
while 31% of the economics students explained their behavior solely
with respect to features of the game, only 17% of the non-economics
students did so." Finally, the study revealed that: (1) expectations
about the other player's choice strongly influence a player's behavior;
and (2) even holding expectations constant, economics students de-
fect at a significantly higher rate than do non-economics students.4
Other studies have found that economics majors behave signifi-
cantly more like the neoclassical economics model predicts than do
non-economics majors in ultimatum bargaining games.4 6 These are
two-person games in which the first player (the allocator) has to pro-
pose how to divide a sum of money (ten dollars in the experiments)
between that player and another player (the receiver), who can ac-
cept the proposed split, or refuse, in which case both players get
nothing. The fact that these games are one-shot should rule out
reputation and repetition effects. Standard economic theory predicts
a division of $9.99 to player one and only $0.01 to the other player. 7
But, experimental research found that fifty-fifty splits are the most
commonly made proposal by allocators, while receivers will reject very
43 See id. at 166.
4 See id. at 166-67. The probability of such a difference being due to chance is less
than 0.005. See id. at 167.
See id.
46 See, e.g., John R. Carter & Michael D. Irons, Are Economists Different, and If So,
Why, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1991, at 171; Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the
Assumptions of Economics, 59J. BUS. S285 (1986).
4 Technically, this is the only subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Basically,
threats by the receiver to reject $0.01 are not credible because $0.01 is greater than $0.
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one-sided proposals as being unfair. 8 In both the role of allocator
and receiver, economics (or commerce) majors acted more like stan-
dard economic theory predicts than non-economics majors (or psy-
chology students). This experimental design assigned allocator and
receiver roles through a preliminary word game, which might have
led allocators to feel they deserved a bigger split than receivers did
because they "earned" their position. This issue has been addressed
in two well-known related studies, which replaced the word game with
a coin flip game.4' Further, the above findings are robust with respect
to the size of the monetary payoffs involved"0 and the nationality of
the subjects involved.5'
What do all of these findings mean? They certainly provide sup-
port for two propositions: (1) Economics is a language that affects
the behavior and expectations of speaker and listener; and (2) there
is a tendency for economics models to become self-fulfilling, al-
though this is not always the case.
The issue of whether or not exposure to monetary commensur-
ability by itself, as opposed to more generally the language of eco-
nomics, affects behavior is not resolved by the above findings,
however, because all of the above experiments investigating the im-
pact of economics instruction are joint tests of not only the behavioral
impacts of learning about monetary commensurability, but also the
behavioral impacts of learning about other aspects of the language of
economics, such as the assumption of rationality in the sense of the
pursuit of self-interest.
IV. ENDOGENOUS MONETARY COMMENSURABILITY
What is perhaps most disturbing about commensurability to in-
commensurabilists is commensurability with money because it is ar-
gued that money is a one-dimensional cardinal scale which flattens
's See Werner Gfith et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 383 (1982).
'9 See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An
Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of DistributiveJustic, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 259,
267-72 (1985) (describing the various experimental instructions used in the study);
Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25
J.L. & ECON. 73, 82-91 (1982) (describing the experimental design using two-person
and three-person experiments).
so See Elizabeth Hoffman et al., On Expectations and Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum
Games, 25 INT'LJ. GAME THEORY 289, 299 (1996).
' See Alvin E. Roth et al., Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana,
Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1068 (1991).
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out and impoverishes the multidimensional contours and richness of
life.5' But such a one-dimensional view of money is by no means uni-
versal, as evidenced by the findings of economic sociology53 and be-
havioral economics.54 Of course, the same criticism of projection of
multiple dimensions of reality into a single dimension of analysis al-
ready applies to utilitarianism in general, even when utility functions
are not expressed in wealth, but only are reducible to abstract
"utils. ' '5' As noted by the Nobel Economics Laureate Kenneth Arrow
in his review of Radin's book:
It is, of course, no part of utility theory that everything has a price. To
be sure, when commodities are infinitely divisible and indifference sur-
faces are convex, then marginal variations in commodity use are com-
mensurable with each other and therefore with money or income,
thought of as generalized purchasing power. But the typical examples
designed to show the absurdity or immorality of assigning a money value
to activities are based on finite changes.56
Richard Epstein makes a similar point about discontinuous
choices As Arrow states, the fact "that parents would not sell a child
at any price is in no way inconsistent with ordinary economic the-
ory.""' However, the same parents who would not accept any amount
of money to sell their child would most likely be willing to pay their
entire financial or physical wealth to a kidnapper as ransom in order
to "buy back" their child.59 Thus, the issue appears to be that, in a
market for one's children, selling prices are inappropriate no matter
how high, while buying prices are appropriate no matter how high
(or become more so as they get higher, until all of the parents' mone-
52 See RADIN, supra note 11, at 9 (denying the commensurability of value and argu-
ing that such an approach "may debase... the way humans value things important to
human personhood").
" See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 1 (1997) ("This book
explains the remarkably various ways in which people identify, classify, organize, use,
segregate, manufacture, design, store, and even decorate monies as they cope with
their multiple social relations.").
54 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice 211 SCIENcE 453, 457 (1981) (describing the results of a study which demon-
strated a "paradoxical variation in the value of money [that] is incompatible with the
standard analysis of consumer behavior").
' See RADIN, supra note 11, at 119-20 ("The idea of fungibility, even without com-
mensurability, still undermines the notion of individual uniqueness.").
5 KennethJ. Arrow, Invaluable Goods, 35J. ECON. LITERATURE 757, 759 (1997).
See Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of the
World?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 683, 690-93.
Arrow, supra note 56, at 759.
'9 Thanks to Evelyn Brody for pointing this out.
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tary resources have been exhausted). By the same token, anybody
who tries to buy a child from a parent, as opposed to buying one back
from a kidnapper, is viewed as being engaged in an inappropriate
form of behavior no matter how high the offer price (and perhaps
with higher offers being viewed as more inappropriate than lower
ones). The gap between bid and ask prices is not exclusively due to
an "endowment effect"60 from becoming emotionally attached to
one's children, but also to notions of what are socially appropriate
prices (namely, zero and infinite, respectively, or as close to those
values as feasible). This discussion is related to an explanation of laws
banning usury, price gouging, ticket scalping, prostitution, commer-
cial surrogacy, and baby-selling based on the notion of what is fair in
terms of "being close to" a "reference transaction. " 6'
So, what is the real concern that incommensurabilists have about
monetary commensurability? Part of the concern seems to be a fear
that a culture of explicit monetary commensurability will result in the
possibility of universal commodification. The notion that explicit, as
opposed to implicit, monetary commensurability is dangerous relies
either on a myopia or on an externality rationale for prohibiting ex-
plicit monetary commensurability. This argument is related to indi-
vidual or social desires to engage in public denial of monetary
commensurability in order to conceal tragic or desperate choices. 62
In addition, this argument relates to Michael Fitts's arguments for the
desirability of less information in political decisionmaking6 Finally,
such an argument assumes that individuals' tastes are malleable, or,
in the jargon of economics, that preferences are endogenous.
The notion that preferences are shaped by our past experiences,
as well as by current social and cultural influences, has been formally
modeled by Gary Becker's research into where preferences come
60 See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Themy of Consumer Choice 1 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 39, 43-47 (1980) (providing examples of how the endowment effect explains
behavior in buying and selling decisions).
61 See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 32, 35, on file with the University of Pennsylva-
nia Law Review) (discussing laws that ban economic transactions).
62 See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHIUP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978) (discussing
"tragic choices" and the processes of allocation of resources).
63 See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive Influ-
ence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REv. 917, 954-55 (1990) (discussing an argu-
ment that "an ideological debate in a real-world political environment, where people
are aware of their self-interests and their ideologies differ, can often exacerbate divisions
and undermine the ability to reach a consensus").
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from.6 The ideas of changing preferences by advertising, marketing,
political campaigns, democratic deliberation, and persuasion are all
familiar ones.6 Informational campaigns by a government (such as
anti-smoking crusades) involve indirect preference shaping from the
provision of (selected) information, as well as more direct forms of
preference manipulation via the framing and presentation of that
information. In fact, in light of well-known cognitive biases, provid-
ing information may effectively result in providing advice.6
A. Psychological Game-Theoretic Models
A recent development in game theory is that of psychological
games, which explicitly incorporate elements of social psychology into
67game theory. Game theory, more accurately called multiperson
decision theory, is a branch of applied mathematics with numerous
applications in economics,0 politics,69 law,70 biology,7' and manage-
ment.J Psychological games capture the idea of belief-dependent
emotions, such as disappointment, regret, or surprise. In a psycho-
logical game, at least one player's payoffs depend on beliefs about
6 See GARY S. BEcKER, AcCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996). Two Nobel Economics
Laureates, George Stigler and Gary Becker, coauthored a seminal paper in this area.
See George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON.
REV. 76 (1977) (discussing the economist's search for an explanation of differences in
behavior).
65 See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 952
(1996) (discussing various methods of "norm management" at the local, state, and
federal levels).
6 Seejolls et al., supra note 61 (manuscript at 49) (recognizing that "there is often
no 'neutral' way to present information" and thus "he who provides information ends
up giving advice").
67 See, e.g., John Geanakoplos et al., Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality, 1
GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 60 (1989); Van Kolpin, Equilibrium Refinement in Psychological
Games, 4 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 218 (1992).
0 SeeJORGEN EICHBERGER, GAME THEORY FOR ECONOMISTS at xi (1993) ("In eco-
nomics in particular, theory is often conducted in terms of game-theoretic concepts.").
See JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR POLTICAL SCIENTISTS 1-3 (1994)
(suggesting that game theory provides explanations for decisions and outcomes in
politics).
70 See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Strategic Behavior and the Law: A Guide for Legal Scholars
to Game Theory and the Law and Other Game Theory Texts, 36JURIMETRICSJ. 99 (1995)
(reviewing DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORYAND THE LAW (1994)).
71 See LARRY SAMUELSON, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 17
(1997) (discussing how "[e]volutionary game theory takes both its name and its basic
techniques from work in biology").
7 SeeJOHN McMILLAN, GAMES, STRATEGIES, AND MANAGERS 3 (1992) (using game
theory to "investigate decision-making in business organizations").
17151998]
1716 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 146:1701
some other player's choices, or higher order beliefs over such be-
liefs.7 3 Psychological game-theoretic models of monopoly pricing and
labor economics explain why firms do not always charge monopoly
prices nor behave with respect to workers as neoclassical economics
predicts.74 Moreover, these models explain how the presence of en-
dogenously generated emotions affect the frequency of suits that go
to trial rather than settling.7 5 Psychological versions of a one-sided
prisoner's dilemma explain how to control bureaucratic corruption
and tax evasion. 6
Although emotions can be a response to strategic decisions cho-
sen by other economic actors, emotions may not depend on beliefs
about such choices. Emotional responses of this category can be sim-
ply incorporated into a game by altering the payoffs in a way that does
not depend on beliefs over strategies. 77 Psychological games focus on
other types of emotional responses, namely, those responses that de-
pend on beliefs about strategic actions. The term "belief-dependent"
differentiates such emotional responses from "belief-independent"
emotional responses. Belief-dependent emotional responses provide
an explanation of why the same action can result in different emo-
tional reactions on the part of a given individual at different times. A
person may or may not feel particular emotions in response to a fixed
strategic decision, with the difference being due to different beliefs
about the choice in question. So, the difference between belief-
dependent and belief-independent emotional responses is that the
former involve endogenously determined payoffs, while the latter
involve exogenously fixed payoffs.
The role of belief-independent emotional responses in strategic
interaction has been studied already in the economics literature8 Animportant feature of psychological games is the role that beliefs (over
73 See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 31, 32 (1992).
74 See Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM.
ECON. REV. 1281, 1282 (1990) (developing a game-theory paradigm for incorporating
altruistic and spiteful emotions into economic models).
7- See Huang & Wu, supra note 73 (demonstrating that emotions such as anger,
pride, and revenge affect the frequency of going to trial).
76 See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of
Social Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 391 (1994) (using
psychological game theory to predict the likelihood of corrupt behavior).
77 See id. at 392.
7" See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF
THE EMOTIONS (1988) (noting the tendencies of people to fail to pursue material self-
interest because of (belief-independent) emotional responses).
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strategic decisions) explicitly play in endogenously modifying prefer-
ences through emotions. Belief-dependent emotions involve changes
in utility that depend on endogenously determined equilibrium be-
liefs about decisions. Emotions that are independent of players' be-
liefs about behavior or that depend on incorrect beliefs about
behavior reflect exogenous tastes. Emotions that are dependent on
players' beliefs over choices are sensitive to equilibrium behavior if
such beliefs are required to correspond to actual decisions. People
obviously feel emotions. The issue here, however, is whether exoge-
nously fixed emotional payoffs capture the full spectrum of emotional
responses. The capacity to experience feelings is not uniquely hu-
man. After all, nonhuman life feels pain, anger, fear, and rage. But
only humans have the additional capacity of self-awareness. Part of
that self-awareness includes the ability to formulate beliefs about the
actions chosen by other humans. Psychological game theory enlarges
the scope and domain of rational choice theory by introducing beliefs
over strategic behavior into utility functions. The beliefs on which
emotions and thus preferences depend often can be interpreted as
alternative (organizational) cultures or social norms.
B. A Contagion Model
The underlying idea of psychological game theory, that people of-
ten feel emotions based on their beliefs about how others will choose
to behave, provides a formal analytical framework to model the possi-
ble contagion effects of monetary commensurability regarding a cer-
tain value. If P denotes the proportion of a society which engages in
monetary commensurability of that value, then P lies in the closed
interval [0, 1]. Let R denote the mean of an individual's beliefs over
P. In other words, R is the subjective expected value of P. Let I de-
note the status quo utility for those who do not engage in monetary
commensurability of the value in question. Let C denote the status
quo utility of switching to engage in monetary commensurability of
the value in question for those who do not engage initially in mone-
tary commensurability. By assumption, I > C. Suppose that the utility
from not engaging in monetary commensurability of the value in
question decreases (for simplicity, linearly) in R. That is, we assume
that the utility from not engaging in monetary commensurability of
the value in question is represented by a function of R in the form:
U(R) = I- AR, where A > 0 and C > (I- A). The condition that A > 0 is
the formal representation of the assumption that an individual's util-
ity from not engaging in monetary commensurability of the value in
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question decreases with that individual's expected value for the pro-
portion of society which engages in monetary commensurability. The
condition that C > (I - A) is the formal representation of the hypothe-
sis that the utility from engaging in monetary commensurability of
the value in question is greater than the utility from not engaging in
monetary commensurability of the value in question when everybody
else in society is expected to engage in monetary commensurability of
that value (i.e., when R = E(P) = 1).
In any psychological game, psychological equilibria are character-
ized by two conditions: (1) beliefs over strategies are correct, that is,
R = P, and (2) strategies form a Nash equilibrium, in that no player
has any unilateral incentive to deviate from her strategy choice. The
requirement that the practice or culture of monetary commensurabil-
ity of a value is socially constructed is captured by the idea that beliefs
must be in equilibrium and thus consistent with actual social behav-
ior. The requirement that the strategies form a Nash equilibrium
captures the standard game-theoretic notion that players' strategies
constitute best replies to each other. This game has two strategies,
either engaging in monetary commensurability of the value in ques-
tion or not engaging in monetary commensurability of the value in
question. There are three psychological equilibria, two pure and one
mixed, namely: R* = 0, R** = 1, and R***where 0 < R*** < 1.
The first pure strategy psychological equilibrium involves R* = P*
= 0 or the status quo of nobody choosing to engage in monetary
commensurability of the value in question because I > C by assump-
tion. The second pure strategy psychological equilibrium involves
R** = P** = 1, or the other polar outcome of everybody choosing to
engage in monetary commensurability of the value in question be-
cause C > (I -A) by assumption. Finally, the third and mixed strategy
psychological equilibrium involves R*** = P*** = (I - C)/A,79 or the
outcome where the proportion (I - C)/A of society chooses to engage
in monetary commensurability of the value in question (with the
complementary proportion, namely, 1 [(I - C)/A] = (A - I + C)/A of
society choosing not to engage in monetary commensurability of the
value in question) .8 As in a nonpsychological mixed strategy equilib-
71 The value (I- C)/A > 0, because I > C by assumption or (I- ) > 0 and A > 0 by
assumption. The value (I- C)/A < 1, because (I- C) <A by assumption.
80 The value (A - I + )/A > 0, because A > 0 by assumption and A - I + C = C - (I- A)
> 0, which is true because C> (I- A) by assumption. In addition, the value (A -I + C)/A
< 1, because A - I + C = A - (I- ) < A, which is true because (I- C) > 0, which is true
because I> C by assumption.
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rium, the utilities from choosing either pure strategy are the same. In
other words, in the mixed-strategy psychological equilibrium, an indi-
vidual is indifferent over the pure strategies used with positive prob-
ability.
The difficulty and possibility of changing the prevailing le-
gal/moral culture is reflected by the fact that individuals are unable
to move unilaterally among multiple equilibria, but are able to do so
collectively. The shared beliefs that human emotions depend on will
vary with the particular context. For certain values, such as those for
which organized markets exist and function smoothly in a society, R =
1. Everybody in that society will engage in monetary commensurabil-
ity of that value. Universal monetary commensurability of a value
corresponds to an emotional disutility from not engaging in monetary
commensurability because of beliefs placing a probability of one on
other members of society engaging in monetary commensurability for
that value. For other values, such as loyalty and trust, for which there
are no markets, R = 0, and nobody will engage in monetary commen-
surability of that value. Universal monetary incommensurability of a
value corresponds to no emotional disutility from not engaging in
monetary commensurability due to beliefs placing a probability of
zero on other members of society engaging in monetary commensur-
ability for that value. Finally, there are those "contested" values for
which a certain intermediate proportion, P*** where 0 < P*** < 1, of
society will engage in monetary commensurability of that value. In-
complete monetary commensurability of that value corresponds to an
intermediate level of emotional disutility from not engaging in mone-
tary commensurability due to beliefs placing a probability strictly be-
tween zero and one on other members of society engaging in
monetary commensurability for that value.
The above model suggests a natural role that legal policy can have
in selecting one focal point among the multiple possible equilibrium
outcomes by selecting a probability belief about what others will do as
being salient or likely. In so doing, legal practices such as awarding
monetary tort damages can alter beliefs over the degree of actual
monetary commensurability as well as monetary commensurability
discourse, thereby altering the resulting social equilibrium outcome
by altering individual preferences regarding monetary commensur-
ability.
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V. END OGENOUS ATTITUDES OVER COMMODIFICATION
The above model can easily be reinterpreted to provide a formal
analytical framework to model the possible domino effect that com-
modification can have across values. Reinterpret P as the proportion
of values (or the time) that the law or government agencies commod-
ify. As before, Plies in the closed interval [0, 1 ]. Reinterpret R to be
the mean of an individual's beliefs over P. As before, R is the subjec-
tive expected value of P. Reinterpret I to be the status quo utility for
an individual not to engage in any commodification. This could be
thought of as representing a Marxian "utopia" of universal noncom-
modification. Reinterpret C as the status quo utility of switching to
engage in universal commodification for those who initially engaged
in universal noncommodification. By assumption, I > C. Suppose
that the utility from engaging in universal noncommodification de-
creases (for simplicity, linearly) in R That is, we assume that the
utility from engaging in universal noncommodification is represented
by a function of R of the form: U(R) = I- AR, where A > 0 and C > (I-
A). The condition that A > 0 is the formal representation of the as-
sumption that an individual's utility from engaging in universal non-
commodification decreases with that individual's expected value for
the proportion of values commodified by the legal system or govern-
ment policies. The condition that C > (I -A) is the formal representa-
tion of the hypothesis that an individual's utility from engaging in
universal commodification is greater than the utility from engaging in
universal noncommodification when laws or government policies are
expected to engage in universal commodification, that is, when R =
E(P) = 1.
As in the model in Part IV, this game has two strategies, namely,
engaging in universal commodification versus engaging in universal
noncommodification. As before, there are three psychological equi-
libria, two pure ones and one mixed one, namely: R* = 0, R** = 1,
and R*** with 0 < R*** < 1. In this reinterpretation of the model in
Part IV, there are three endogenous degrees of commodification
associated with three equilibrium probability beliefs, which can be
interpreted as endogenously determined corresponding social norms.
The first pure-strategy psychological equilibrium involves R* = P*
= 0 and represents a world in which the state and individuals engage
in universal noncommodification. The second pure-strategy psycho-
logical equilibrium involves R** = P** = I or the other polar outcome
in which the state and individuals engage in universal commodifica-
tion. Finally, the third and mixed-strategy psychological equilibrium
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involves R*** = P*** = (I - C)/A, or the outcome where the state and
individuals commodify this proportion, (I - C)/A, of the possible val-
ues or that proportion of the time (and do not commodify the com-
plementary proportion, namely 1 - [(I - C)/A] = (A - I + C)/A, of the
possible values or that proportion of the time).
As before, this model implies that legal or government policy can
select a focal point among the multiple possible equilibria, by choos-
ing a probability belief about what the state or the legal system will do
as being salient or likely. In so doing, government practices or legal
policies such as the use of monetary CBA can alter beliefs over the
degree of actual commodification as well as commodification dis-
course, and thus can alter the resulting social equilibrium outcome by
altering individual preferences over commodification.
CONCLUSION
The articles by Craswell and Adler, and more generally this Sym-
posium, make an important contribution to legal scholarship by warn-
ing us not to engage in commensurability discourse unquestioningly
or inappropriately. More importantly, there is a strong argument for
proceeding with care even when the discourse of commensurability is
used tentatively and appropriately, because that discourse has a po-
tentially dehumanizing effect. Of course, there are many dialects
within the language of commensurability, and commensurability is
just one language among many. Commensurability rhetoric is a pow-
erful and seductive force with much appeal. But we must use that
rhetoric wisely and cautiously, especially when examining contested
examples, such as baby-selling and vote-trading.
The key question we as a society must answer is whether we are
willing and able to "buy" into some, but not necessarily all, of com-
mensurability rhetoric if it reflects and usefully shapes the legal and
social world. The answer has to be and hopefully is yes. That univer-
sal monetary commensurability or commodification would lead to a
strange understanding of humanity is a position most people would
believe is true. This is formally captured in the models of Parts IV
and V by the fact that individuals' utilities are lower in a world where
all of society engages in monetary commensurability of a value or
where the state engages in universal commodification as compared to
a world in which they do not so engage. Even most economists view
the Arrow-Debreu system of complete markets not as a positive de-
scription likely to ever accurately reflect reality, but rather as a nor-
mative benchmark against which one can compare reality.
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It is also virtually inconceivable that our current society could
adopt universal monetary incommensurability or noncommodifica-
tion. This leaves the stage for some type of incomplete monetary
commensurability and commodification. The purpose of the models
in Parts IV and V is to demonstrate how this "Middle Way" is theoreti-
cally possible. Of course, the models are simplistic. Individuals who
do not engage in universal monetary commensurability or commodi-
fication may not have the preferences assumed in those models.
They may be committed to not engaging in universal monetary com-
mensurability or commodification regardless of the actions of other
members of society or the state. If that is the case, though, there is no
reason to be concerned about the social psychological effects of
monetary commensurability or commodification. The models are
constructed to demonstrate that even when individuals' preferences
are malleable, there are other possible outcomes besides universal
monetary commensurability or commodification. That such a propo-
sition can be proven even in a utilitarian framework is the substantive
contribution of those models.
